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The
Human Factors Assessment:
Passive Final Approach Spacing Tool
Operational Evaluation
(pFAST)
KATHARINE K. LEE AND BEVERLY D. SANFORD*
Ames Research Center
1.0 Summary
Automation to assist air traffic controllers in the current
terminal and en route air traffic environments is being
developed at Ames Research Center in conjunction with
the Federal Aviation Administration. This automation,
known collectively as the Center-TRACON Automation
System (CTAS), provides decision-making assistance to
air traffic controllers through computer-generated
advisories. One of the CTAS tools developed specifically
to assist terminal area air traffic controllers is the Final
Approach Spacing Tool (FAST), which was tested
extensively both in simulation and in the field. In 1996,
FAST underwent an operational evaluation at the
Dallas/Ft. Worth, Texas, Terminal Radar Approach
Control (TRACON) facility. Engineering results showed
increases in throughput and runway balancing efficiency.
Human factors data collected during the test describe the
impact of the automation upon the air traffic controller in
terms of perceived workload and acceptance. The human
factors results showed that controller self-reported work-
load was not significantly increased or reduced by the
FAST automation; rather, controllers reported that the
levels of workload remained primarily the same.
Controller coordination and communication data were
analyzed, and significant differences in the nature of
controller coordination were found. Acceptance ratings
indicated that this new system was acceptable.
This report discusses the human factors data that were
collected during the 1996 FAST Operational Field
Evaluation and describes the controller-reported levels of
acceptance, usability, and workload in the operational
environment. The lessons learned from the perspective
of human factors in the field testing process will also be
discussed, along with comments on the development of
future air traffic control automation.
* Sterling Software, Inc., Redwood City, California.
2.0 Introduction
Automation tools to assist air traffic controllers in the
current terminal and en route air traffic environments is
being developed at Ames Research Center in conjunction
with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). This set
of tools is collectively known as the Center-TRACON
Automation System (CTAS), which provides decision-
making assistance to air traffic controllers through
computer-generated advisories. CTAS is distinctively
human-centered and works to optimize arrival traffic flow
for both the en route and terminal area environments
(ref. 1). CTAS is comprised of several tools; three of
these--the Traffic Management Advisor (TMA), the
Descent Advisor (DA), and the Final Approach Spacing
Tool (FAST)---have all undergone thousands of hours of
controller-in-the-loop simulation testing and in the past
several years have been the focus of extensive field test-
ing. The tools have been developed at the field sites in
Dallas/Ft. Worth, Texas, and Denver, Colorado. The focus
of this paper is the human factors results from the
operational field evaluation of the terminal area tool,
FAST. Further information regarding the development
and testing of TMA and DA can be found in other
publications (refs. 2-8).
FAST provides advisory information to the air traffic
controllers in the terminal area, also known as the
Terminal Radar Approach Control, or TRACON. The
FAST advisory information, as initially conceptualized,
included turn, heading, and speed clearances, as well as
runway assignments and sequence numbers (ref. 9). The
advisories were integrated into the arrival controllers' radar
displays by adding runway assignments and sequence
numbers to the full datablock (FDB) and by providing
symbology to indicate locations where speed clearances
and turns should be initiated. In the early development of
FAST, as with the other CTAS tools, controllers from
the field sites participated in simulations and provided
feedback into the development process. The controllers
indicated that displaying all five types of advisories
together on their monochrome radar displays produced
excessive clutter. For this as well as other concerns, the
FASTfunctionalitywassplit into "passive" and "active"
phases (ref. 10). The passive phase includes the runway
and sequence number advisories. The active phase adds the
turn and speed advisories. Passive FAST (pFAST) was
developed first, and recently completed an operational field
evaluation at the Dallas/Ft. Worth TRACON (DFW).
Active FAST is currently under development at Ames
Research Center and is scheduled to begin simulation
testing near the end of 1998.
The engineering specifications, methods, and results of the
pFAST field evaluation are reported in several publi-
cations (refs. 11-13). Overall, an increase in throughput
and runway balancing efficiency was shown, coupled with
benefits demonstrated for Tower operations (ref. 11). But
as Hopkin (ref. 14) has stated, for a system to be success-
fully developed for air traffic control (ATC), significant
benefits must be provided to the air traffic controller or air
traffic facility. Thus, it is important to fully understand
levels of perceived workload and the aspects of the
automation that influence controller acceptance. The
evaluation and assessment of these issues fall under the
domain of human factors, an important part of CTAS
development which contributes to the characteristically
human-centered design of CTAS as a whole.
Hopkin's statement is a reminder that engineering and
human factors should work together to develop ATC
automation. If development were not coupled in this way,
it would be possible to create ATC automation aids that
increase traffic handling capacity, but as a by-product also
increase controller workload, stress, and required coordi-
nation. Such systems would ultimately be doomed to
failure because of unjustifiable demands upon both the
facility and the controllers, which could easily lead to an
unsafe situation. By the same token, it would be possible
to create a very usable human-computer interface with
many of the latest interface design innovations, but which
lacks significant, sophisticated advances "under the hood."
Such a system would also fail because the interface alone
cannot guarantee that the user will be able to effectively
gather and process information, and the system may do
nothing to reduce or mitigate workload or stress.
The CTAS tool development process has successfully
coupled engineering and human factors efforts. This report
will first describe previous ATC automation development,
then the framework for the pFAST operational evaluation.
Then methods used in the operational evaluation and
detailed results and discussion are provided. Preliminary
results have appeared in other publications (refs. 11
and 15), but are discussed here in significantly more
detail.
2.1 The Introduction of Automation into a
Complex Environment
The ATC environment provides many unique challenges
to the introduction of new systems. As the first responsi-
bility of the air traffic control system is safety, anything
that is attached to the ATC environment must not
compromise safety. In addition, the ATC environment has
highly specialized constraints on lighting, displays, radar
interface, and procedural and personnel requirements.
Because there has been little change in the U.S. ATC
facility equipment in the last 20-30 years, new software
automation must work within existing FAA guidelines
and procedures that may not be easily altered. In the
TRACONs throughout the United States, for example, the
typical c_troller display is a large, monochrome radar
scope with the aircraft information presented via alpha-
numeric data tags associated with alphanumeric position
symbols. This graphical user interface is unable to present
menus, windows, and other such features which are
considered conventional components of current human-
computer interfaces. As a result, recent software develop-
ment approaches regarding human factors issues may not
be appropriate, and may need to be modified to meet the
requirements of the specialized ATC environment.
The CTAS software development process utilizes
procedures that are common to industry software develop-
ment, such as rapid prototyping, change tracking, and
verification and validation (M. Eshow, personal
communication, 1997). These procedures have worked
well within the development of CTAS because they
enable iterative development and testing, and allow for
user feedback before full implementation. Consequently,
safety cencems and other problems can be resolved and
demonstrated to users early, thus enhancing user confi-
dence in the system. In addition, users have direct involve-
ment with all aspects of the development process: the
software changes, the testing, and the interaction with the
developers themselves. Extensive simulations are
conducted before the system is introduced into the field,
and sometimes in the early stages of field deployment and
testing. Human factors assessment is integrated through-
out CT_S development to measure the impact on the
controller, as well as to identify where engineering
benefit., may fall short in terms of user acceptance.
Previous development of ATC automation has met with
mixed success. In the United States, the Advanced
Automation System, or AAS, was slated to produce the
next advances in ATC automation. However, the AAS
development experienced many problems, stemming from
issues such as its lack of iterative prototyping and delayed
involvement of controllers in system evaluations
(ref. 16). Human factors expertise was not incorporated in
therequirementsspecificationprocess,andhumanfactors
issueswerelimitedtointerfaceconcerns.Consequently,a
workableATCautomationsystemwasnotproduced.
Incontrast,EuropeanATCautomationdevelopmenthas
metwithbetterresults.Forexample,theGermanresearch
organization,DeutscheForschungsanstaltliarLuftund
Raumfahrt(DLR),hasdevelopeda vancedautomationfor
Germanairtrafficcontrol.DLR-Braunschweighasimple-
mentedtheComputerOrientedMeteringPlanningand
AdvisorySystem(COMPAS)toprovideastrategicarrival
planningsystemforbothterminalareaandenroute
controllers(ref.17).Thissystemunderwentsimulator
evaluations,followedbyoperationaltesting,severalyears
agointheFrankfurtControlCenter.Thedevelopmentof
COMPAShasincorporatedhumanfactorsissuesinits
design,andhadthegoalofmatchingacontroller'smental
modeloftheairtrafficsituation(ref.18)tothe
developmentof heautomation.
2.2 Human Factors Assessment Framework
The human factors operational evaluation of pFAST was
built upon previous human factors evaluations of TMA
and DA (refs. 15 and 19), as well as COMPAS. The
general approach included developing an understanding of
the existing operational environment and the tasks for
which the controllers, area supervisors, and traffic
management coordinators (TMCs) are responsible.
Significant interaction between the researchers and
controllers was required. This interaction helped both
researchers and controllers to define the operational tasks
and the testing objectives, while respecting the boundaries
and needs of both groups during testing activities. In
addition, these interactions contributed to refinement of
data collection procedures and interpretation of results.
The usability, suitability, and acceptance concepts defined
by Harwood (ref. 20) were used to organize the data
collection efforts. Together, these results provide a fairly
complete picture of the human factors impact of pFAST
on the arrival controller. The data collection focused on
each of these three areas, with observations and rating
scales used to assess each category of information. These
areas are defined below.
• Usability: perceptually based aspects of the human-
computer interface, including the interaction with the
interface (such as keystrokes, pointer movement, and
other equipment manipulation).
• Suitability: information content and representation for
the users' tasks; the support of the users' tasks and
the workload level that results.
Acceptance: a final "verdict" on the overall system,
reflecting usability and suitability of the system, as
well as job satisfaction, demonstrable performance,
and esteem (ref. 19).
3.0 Methods
The operational assessment of pFAST took place over a
period of six months. The test was conducted during
arrival traffic rushes spanning the entire spectrum of traffic
patterns at the DFW facility. Engineering data such as
throughput, in-trail separation on final approach, and
adherence to the sequence and runway advisories were
collected; these findings are described in references 11-13.
The engineering team was stationed in a room adjacent to,
but separate from, the operational TRACON. In this
separate area, the engineering data were collected, and the
overall system was monitored during operational use of
pFAST.
The human factors team conducted their data collection
activities on the operational floor. Their role was to
observe operations, collect data, and limit their interaction
with the controllers, except to be available to answer
questions about pFAST. The human factors team also
occasionally provided feedback between the operational
floor and the engineering team.
Data collection in the field, especially over a several-
month effort, is subject to numerous constraints. There is
no opportunity to exercise experimental control over
traffic conditions, and test personnel must adhere to
operational restrictions. It was clearly understood by all
test personnel involved that operational demands took
priority over any type of evaluation activity. Therefore,
the human factors team curtailed their data collection
activities whenever there were excess demands on space or
personnel on the operational floor. Likewise, severe
weather, training requirements, or other operational
constraints on a few occasions led the facility represen-
tative to completely cancel evaluation sessions.
The controllers used pFAST advisories during 25 arrival
rush periods across 7 different rush times. Baseline
observation data were collected during 12 rush periods.
There were 5 rushes in which pFAST was in operation for
only part of the rush. These partial data are not included in
the present report.
The pFAST advisories, which consisted of runway
assignments and sequence numbers to the assigned
runway, were incorporated into the existing Full Digital
Automated Radar Terminal System (ARTS) Displays
(FDADs) utilized by the TRACON arrival controllers.
The advisories were added to the FDBs of the arrival
aircraft(fig. 1). Controllers were required to make a few
additional keyboard entries to input runway changes and
accept runway advisories when they differed from default
runway assignments. This was the extent of any addi-
tionally required physical manipulation of the equipment
when using pFAST.
As shown in figure 1, information on the pFAST FDBs
contained timeshared information on the second line; in
one mode, the default runway assignment and the aircraft
type are displayed. In the second mode, the aircraft's
altitude and speed are displayed. On the third line, the
aircraft's sequence number to the runway allocated by
pFAST is displayed, together with the pFAST runway
advisory, but only if the runway advisory differed from the
default runway assignment. In figure 1, for example, the
pFAST runway advisory is to 17L, and the default runway
assignment is 17C. Until the controller acknowledged the
pFAST runway advisory (through a keyboard entry), the
17L advisory continued to be displayed in the third line of
the FDB. If pFAST's runway advisory did not differ from
the default runway assignment, there would be no addi-
tional runway information in the third line of the FDB.
The sequence number displayed in the third line is for the
pFAST-advised runway. If the controller chose not to
direct the aircraft to the pFAST-suggested runway, another
entry could be made to indicate the controller's runway
assignment, and the sequence number would update
accordingly.
The pFAST Assessment Team (who participated in the
operational evaluation) was composed of a group of eight
controllers and one area supervisor. The Assessment Team
had been involved in the development of pFAST for over
a year prior to the operational evaluation. Consequently,
they were trained to use pFAST and were familiar with its
operation. All of the human factors data were collected
from this pool of controllers, with the exception of two
substitute controllers who participated when there was a
staffing shortage. The substitute controllers were chosen
by the Assessment Team and were briefed on the operation
of pFAST prior to their participation in the operational
evaluation.
The test plan was reviewed by representatives from the
National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA)
who were involved in CTAS development. The human
factors data consisted of questionnaires, operational
observations, and in-depth debriefings. The procedures and
questionnaires were developed with the aid of the Assess-
ment Team controllers to ensure that the observation
methods would not be intrusive to live operations and that
the questionnaires were understandable and meaningful.
3.1 Questionnaire Data
There were several different questionnaires used in the
operational evaluation. A demographics questionnaire was
administered once. The other questionnaires, which
examined usability, suitability, and acceptance issues,
were administered after each test rush. Baseline question-
naire data were not collected as the data collection process
was not finalized sufficiently ahead of time. The rating
scales are listed below. Copies of the rating scales are
provided in Appendix A.
Current pFAST.1 pFAST-2
AAL1583 AAL1583
AAL1583
17C * B75 210 250
DFW*B75 4 17L 4 17L
\ \ \
M M M
Figure I. pFAST information added to the FDAD flight datablocks. Information displayed in Line 2 alternates
('timeshares") the presentation of two groups of information.
Line 1: ACID
Line 2: Current: Airport Destination, Aircraft Type
pFAST- 1: Runway Assignmen-, Aircraft Type
pFAST-2: Altitude, Speed
Line 3: Sequence Advisory, pFAST R.mway Advisory
3.1.1 Overall Workload and Workload Contributors
The workload ratings were collected using two different
scales. First, a scale modeled after the NASA-TLX
(ref. 21) was used to provide workload ratings along a
0 to 10 point range and included questions regarding
mental demand, time pressure, performance support (pro-
vided by the pFAST advisories), overall effort, and the
satisfaction versus frustration experienced. These workload
ratings did not include the paired comparisons that are used
with administering the original TLX. In addition, the
physical demand rating from the original TLX was not
used; in early testing, controllers reported that the physical
demand rating was not a relevant question.
A second scale was used by controllers to rate a list of
possible workload contributors on a range of 1 to 4,
indicating how each of the items contributed to their
overall workload.
3.1.2 In.depth Rush Information
Approximately once per day when pFAST was tested, the
controllers were asked to provide more in-depth informa-
tion regarding one of the rushes. Separate questionnaires
were presented which included questions regarding con-
trolling strategy, perceived coordination, and perceptions
of how the Center handled the traffic flow to the
TRACON (the Center feed).
3.1.3 Acceptance Ratings
The controllers provided a direct acceptance rating using
the Controller Acceptance Rating Scale (CARS) (ref. 10)
after each test rush. The CARS is adopted from the
Cooper-Harper Scale for pilot evaluation of aircraft
handling qualities (refs. 22 and 23). The Cooper-Harper
scale has been used for pilot evaluation since its
development in the late 1960s, becoming a worldwide
standard (ref. 24). The test subject uses the Cooper-Harper
scale by following a decision-tree structure and answering
a series of dichotomous (yes or no) questions. Based on
the responses, a numerical rating on a scale of 1 to 10 is
selected. The Cooper-Harper rating falls into one of four
possible rating groups: controllability, tolerability,
satisfaction, and desirability. For each complete rush in
which the pFAST advisories were shown, the controllers
provided acceptance ratings. A description of the CARS
and the criteria used in the acceptance ratings can be found
in Appendices A and B.
The CARS was developed specifically for the assessment
of CTAS automation and reflects the structure of the
Cooper-Harper scale. The CARS is reoriented from the
Cooper-Harper scale such that a rating of 1 reflects a
lower, more undesirable rating, and a rating of 10 reflects
a higher, more desirable rating. The CARS' physical
appearance is also structured such that the decision-making
process proceeds from the top of the diagram and moves
down. The descriptive anchors for each rating on the scale
reflect the ATC environment, and pFAST automation
specifically (see Appendices A and B for examples of the
CARS form and the guidelines that were used in the
pFAST test).
The use of a Confidence Rating (a rating of A, B, or C),
as with the Cooper-Harper scale, is maintained in the
CARS design. The Confidence Rating is an expression of
how much information the rater had to assess the system.
It is important to reinforce that the Confidence Rating is
not used to express the rater's confidence in the system
itself.
3.2 Controller Observation Data
During both baseline and pFAST test conditions,
observations were recorded by two human factors engi-
neers at two positions along the arrival wall: one between
the two parallel finals and one on the busy side of the rush
(typically this was the East side of the arrival wall).
Figure 2 describes the location of the controller and
observer positions.
West side operations were located on the left of the arrival
wail, and East side operations were located on the right.
The two feeder positions (Feeder West, or FW, and Feeder
East, or FE) were assisted by handoff positions (designated
by "h" preceding the feeder name). The feeder controllers
were responsible for controlling the traffic that arrives
from the Center and merging different streams of traffic
(which may be separated by altitude as well as arrival fix)
into single streams towards the runways. In the DFW
airspace configuration during the operational test, the FW
controller was responsible for merging traffic arriving over
both West arrival fixes, and the FE controller was
responsible for merging traffic arriving over both East
arrival fixes.
The final controllers were responsible for controlling the
traffic handed off from the feeder controllers and directing
the aircraft to their final approach courses. AR2 and AR 1
(the parallel final controllers) were responsible for work-
ing the two parallel runways. Either the Meacham North
(MN) or the Dallas South (DS) position was responsible
for the diagonal runways, 13R (South flow) and 31R
(North flow), respectively. The MN and DS positions
were not co-located on the arrival wail, and observations
were not collected from these positions (though
questionnaire data were collected).
DFW TRACON Arrival Wa_l
hFW FW AR2 ARI FE hFE TMC and
observer scopes
\ / MN and DS positions
typical observer on the opposite side
positions of the room
Figure 2. Controller and observer positions during the operational evaluation.
hFW = handoff, Feeder West FW = Feeder West
hFE = handoff, Feeder East FE = Feeder East
AR 1, AR2: parallel finals
MN = Meacham North DS = Dallas South
Basic characteristics of each observed rush, such as airport
configuration, weather conditions, and changes to staffing,
were noted by the human factors engineers. Coordination
between the area supervisor and the TMCs and between
the area supervisor/TMCs and the Tower and the Center
was also noted. Specific observations were concentrated on
coordination between the arrival controllers along the
arrival wall, and, where possible, coordination with the
Center. Controller coordination was defined as an instance
of any verbal or nonverbal contact that was related to
controlling traffic. The observations from the two
observer positions were merged into a single transcript for
each rush period observed. Any observation events that
were incomplete, or unrelated to the traffic situation, were
not included in the analysis.
The two human factors engineers who recorded the
observations assigned the codes to each observed event by
consensus. The coordination events in the transcript were
assigned codes from 9 general topic areas: Runway,
Sequence, TRACON situation, Aircraft Status,
Coordination, Weather, Traffic Management Issues,
Communication Issues, and Equipment Problems.
Within each of the 9 major categories were a range of 2 to
6 subcategories. A total of 33 subcategories were avail-
able. A full text of the coding categories and the rules for
assigning the codes is provided in Appendix C.
From these data collection materials, the usability,
suitability, and acceptance areas were assessed in the
following manner:
* Usability: primarily questionnaire data pertaining to
issues of keyboard and slewbali use, ability to detect
the advisories themselves, the update rate of the
advisories on the displays, equipment problems, and
related communication problems.
Suitability: questionnaire data pertaining to overall
perceptions of workload, strategies in traffic control,
the helpfulness of the advisories, and coordination and
corruaunication between the various ATC personnel.
Acceptance: questionnaire data regarding specifically
how acceptable the overall system was and comments
from the controllers with regard to their areas of
concern that influenced their acceptance ratings.
4.0 Results
The results are described in a general framework of
usability, suitability, and acceptance, with the exception
of sections 4.1 and 4.2, which describe test period
characteristics and demographics information.
4.1 Test Period Characteristics
The DFW airport operates primarily in either North flow
or South flow, which means that the traffic arrives and
departs _ither landing towards the North or towards the
South. Sauth flow is the predominant airport configura-
tion. Th¢_airport configuration defines the landing
directior as well as which runways are in operation.
During the testing period, it was possible to have, at
most, three runways in the DFW airport configuration
(two parallel runways and one diagonal runway). Since
October 1996, the DFW airport has added another parallel
runway.Forthepurposes of this paper, references to
airport configuration refer to the landing direction and a
three-runway operation. All three runways were in use
whenever human factors data were collected. Six of the
25 total test rushes were in North flow.
One-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were used to
compare North versus South flow questionnaire data. With
the exception of one question, regarding the amount of
perceived coordination between the arrival controllers,
there were no significant differences between North and
South flow responses. Consequently, all of the ques-
tionnaire data are considered together, regardless of airport
configuration.
Passive FAST was tested during seven different rush
periods. These time periods were (in local time):
8:00 AM, 9:30 AM, 11:00 AM, 2:00 I'M, 3:30 PM,
5:00 PM, and 8:00 PM. The majority of the questionnaire
data (nearly 62%) came from the 8 AM, 9:30 AM, and
11 AM rushes. For the purposes of the analysis, the data
were treated all together, regardless of the time of the rush.
This was due to the relatively small amount of data
available, and its unequal distribution across the different
rushes.
4.2 Demographics
Seven members of the Assessment Team filled out a
general demographics questionnaire. Their ATC experience
ranged from 9 to 19 years, with a mean of 13.3 years.
DFW is a level 5 facility, which is the highest level in
the FAA classification of facilities based on their hourly
traffic density (ref. 25). The controllers were asked to
indicate the number of years they spent at a level 5
facility. The reported range of years at a level 5 facility
was 4 to 9 years, with a mean of 5.9 years. The range of
years of experience at DFW TRACON was 3 to 8 years,
with a mean of 5 years.
The controllers were also asked about their experience
with computers as a whole. None of the controllers
reported working with personal computers at work, on a
day-to-day basis. Three of the seven controllers reported
having a personal computer in their homes.
4.3 Usability
Because the use of the FDADs restricted how the
advisories would be presented to the controllers, there were
relatively few changes to the controller interface (see
fig. 1). It was expected that the usability issues would be
confined to the ability of the controllers to visually detect,
and respond to, the advisory information, and to make the
necessary inputs to interact with the system when changes
to the advisories were required.
Questionnaire responses comprise the majority of the
usability data. Questions pertaining to the pFAST
advisories included using the equipment (making handoffs,
using the keyboard and slewball, and making runway
assignment changes), equipment problems, stability and
update rate of the advisories, how much controller
communication and coordination was required, and the use
of the sequence numbers in coordination. Each of these
results will be presented in detail in the sections below.
Several of these questions were phrased in terms of how
the usability item contributed to the controller workload.
This is different from the suitability issues, in that the
usability questions are not concerned with the information
content of the features.
4.3.1 Using the Equipment
As shown in figure 3, giving handoffs, receiving handoffs,
and using the ARTS keyboard and slewball were all rated
as minimally to not at all contributing to the controllers'
workload. Making runway assignment changes overall
was also rated as minimally to not at all contributing to
the controllers' workload. The keyboard entry requirements
as a whole were rated as a little less demanding than
normal keyboard entry requirements.
Feeder controllers are largely responsible for establishing
the aircraft sequences; generally, the final controllers
themselves make few changes to the traffic plan. This is
reflected in the results shown in figure 4; the feeder
controllers rated the keyboard entry requirements signifi-
cantly more demanding than the final controllers
(F (1,42) = 6.406, p < 0.02). The feeder controllers rated
the keyboard entry requirements as about the same as they
currently experience. These results also suggest that the
keyboard entry requirements that are imposed by pFAST
do not add significantly to controller workload.
Of all the controller positions, the hFE controllers rated
the keyboard entries as most demanding. In general, all of
the East side controllers rated the keyboard entries as
significantly more demanding than the West side
controllers. This is likely due to the nature of the rush
patterns at DFW; as the predominance of data collected
was in the morning hours, the rushes were mostly from
the East. Under South flow configurations, rushes were
generally busier for the East side due to the heavier traffic
levels and the fewer available arrival runways on the East
side of the airport.
Greatly
Somewhat
Minimally 2
Not at All 1
Accepting Giving ARTS Slewball Making Runway
Handoffs Handoffs Keyboard Entries Changes
Figure 3. Usability items' contribution to overall workload.
Very 7
Demanding
6
5
About the 4
Same
3
2
Not Very
Demanding 1
Feeder Final
Controllers Controllers
Figure 4. Keyboard entry requirements ratings using pFAST.
4.3.2 Equipment Problems
There were occasional equipment problems during the
operational test. One problem was that the FDAD at the
AR 1 position was unable to display the pFAST advisories
for certain runs. A second problem was interference created
by inadvertent entries from other FDADs. The controllers
rated these occurrences as minimally to not at all
contributing to their workload.
4.3.3 Aavisory Stability
Advisor stability is defined as the pFAST advisories not
changing frequently on the controllers' FDADs. The
pFAST advisories did not generally change past a certain
"freeze" location unless a runway change was made by a
controller or area supervisor using the ARTS keyboard.
Exceptiens to this did occasionally occur; most notable
were sex] uence advisories between two aircraft in which
one aircraft was turning. Sometimes the turn would cause
the advisories to switch between the two. The sequence
would correct itself once the turn was detected or
completed. When runway advisories were changed, there
was sometimes a perceptible delay as the pFAST software
recomputed the advisories and the updated information was
displayed on the FDADs. This delay was usually on the
order of a few radar sweeps, and some controllers
commented that some runway assignments changed later
than expected.
Overall, the controllers reported no obvious stability
problems for the runway and sequence advisories. They
rated the update as occurring neither very well nor very
(fig. 5). Controllers were asked to rate how the
wait for the update contributed to their workload; they
rated this delay as minimally to not at all contributing to
their workload. These results suggest the controllers were
expecting some amount of update-related delay, but what
they experienced was not excessive. It is a potential area
of concern because the feedback is not instantaneous and
the delay is noticeable. However, given the current
hardware constraints on the display of pFAST, some
update delay may be unavoidable.
4.3.4 Coordination and Communication
Coordination and communication were measured both
through observations and through ratings. The ratings
results describe these data in terms of frequency. The
controllers rated the amount of communication that they
had with the aircraft under their control. On average, the
controllers reported talking to each aircraft a range of 2 to
5 times. The reported average over all of the controllers
was 3.8 times (SD = 0.80). None of the controllers
reported having to talk to any aircraft more frequently due
to the pFAST advisories.
A single sample of the actual communication between
each arrival controller and each aircraft that was worked
was taken from one busy North flow rush. From this
sample, it was calculated that across all the positions,
controllers communicated with each aircraft an average of
3.74 times. This single sample is not adequate to suggest
how reliable the controllers are about predicting the
frequency of communication with the aircraft, but with
further analysis of such data, the actual radio communi-
cation impact of using pFAST can be determined. Such
data will be analyzed and discussed in a future report.
The controllers were also asked to rate the level of
coordination required (with other controllers and facilities)
during the test. They reported that the level of coordi-
nation that was required was not in excess of what they
normally experienced.
4.3.5 Use of the Sequence Advisories in Coordination
The conn'ollers reported referring to the sequence
advisories _ to sometimes when coordinating with
other controllers. The average response was 2.30
(SD = 1.37) on a scale of 1= rarely to 7 = often.
4.4 Suitability
Objective workload measures, such as throughput and
runway balancing, indicate the impact of automation on
the work environment, but do not provide adequate
information about controller workload, or coordination
required between controllers. Therefore, suitability
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Figure 5. How well the advisories updated in response to changes.
questions are used to assess how the system provides
assistance to the controller in performing ber/his job.
Suitability issues concern the ability of pFAST to
support controlling strategies and planning. To meet
its intended functionality, pFAST must provide accurate
and useful information. The major issues of interest
within the category of suitability are workload and coordi-
nation/communication. Workload has been a key concern
of all parties involved in the development of pFAST.
The workload data are examined by considering all the
controller positions equally; the data are not analyzed
separately (East versus West side controllers, or feeder
versus final controllers). Again, this was done because of
the relatively small sample size and a restricted amount of
data available in the different conditions.
4.4.1 Workload
In the beginning of the pFAST operational evaluation, the
traffic into DFW TRACON arrived at a "free-flow" traffic
rate. A traffic rate, or airport acceptance rate, reflects a
number of arriving aircraft per given time period
(typically, an hour). A free-flow rate is one that essen-
tially allows traffic from the Center to enter the TRACON
with no restrictions (such as metering) on the number of
aircraft. This was done in part to exercise the limits of
pFAST (by feeding as much traffic as they could into the
TRACON). One possible covariate in the analysis of the
workload questionnaire data was the decision to stop
allowing the traffic to free-flow into the TRACON. This
decision was made approximately three months into the
operational evaluation and was based on two main factors:
(1) the enhanced capacity with pFAST had already been
demonstrated, and (2) the Center traffic feeds were, at
times, too inconsistent during the peak flow periods.
After the decision to stop allowing free-flow rates under
pFAST testing conditions, the traffic fed by the Center
was limited to a rate of 102 aircraft per hour. An analysis
of the questionnaire data was conducted to contrast the
ratings before and after free-flow rate conditions. No
significant differences between the runway advisory
agreement before and after free-flow conditions were found.
Consequently, the remainder of the data described below
combines both traffic rate levels in the analyses.
4.4. I. 1 Overall Workload
The areas of workload described in the following section
include workload scale (TLX-modeled) questions, con-
trolling strategies (including planning activities), and
sequence and runway advisory usage and support.
As described earlier, the workload scale used to measure
overall workload incorporated categories of mental
demand, time pressure, performance support, overall
effort, and satisfaction versus frustration. The workload
scale utilized a 0 to 10 range, with 0 representing the
lowest score (lowest workload, most favorable rating) and
10 representing the highest score (highest workload, least
favorable rating). Figure 6 depicts the mean workload
ratings from the workload scale.
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Figure 6. Workload scale ratings.
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As can be seen from the graph, all of the responses are
clustered around the middle of the scale. This suggests that
pFAST did not increase controller workload. There is also
no dramatic reduction in controller workload.
4.4.1.2 Controlling Strategies
It was of interest to determine how pFAST advisory
information was incorporated into the controllers' tasks,
as well as to determine how pFAST might be selectively
utilized.
The helpfulness of the sequence numbers in terms of
providing a common reference point was rated from
1 to 7, where 1 represented not at all useful and 7
represented very_ useful. The mean rating was 2.66
(SD = 1.35).
The controllers were asked to rate the amount of effort
required to use the pFAST advisories. The mean response
was 4.29 (SD = 0.77), which was slightly above the
middle anchor of about the same towards the made it much
easier end of the scale.
Controllers were asked if they followed the advisories
more at some times than at others; one-third of the
responses to this question were "yes." The reasons given
for how the controllers followed the advisories were
contradictory, however; some of the controllers reported
greater advisory use during lower traffic conditions, and
some reported greater advisory use during higher traffic
conditions.
Controllers were also asked how pFAST advisories
affected their ability to control traffic in their sectors.
The mean response, on a scale of 1 to 7, was 4.43
(SD = 0.67). Controllers reported that, overall, pFAST
had no effect on their ability to control traffic in their
sectors.
The controllers were asked if they felt that they had to
compensate for the pFAST advisories by changing what
they would normally do. One-third of the responses were
"yes." There was no additional elaboration on this result,
however.
4.4.1.2.1 Sending and Receiving Aircraft "Over-the-
Top." Sending aircraft over the top of the airport is a
procedure that may arise because of the pFAST runway
advisories. As mentioned earlier, under South flow, the
East side controllers direct traffic to primarily one runway
and the West side controllers direct traffic to primarily two
runways. Consequently, when the bulk of the traffic is
arriving from the East, pFAST may suggest runway
advisories that would involve sending aircraft over-the-top,
which would likely produce better runway balancing, and
help to off-load the East side controllers. However,
sending aircraft over-the-top may not always be the easiest
task for a controller.
Figure 7 depicts the controller ratings of sending and
receiving aircraft over-the-top. Sending aircraft over-the-
top was rated as somewhat to minimally contributing to
the overall workload, and receiving aircraft over-the-top
was rated as minimally to not at all contributing to the
overall workload. These are moderately positive results
which suggest that the added tasks of changing runway
assignments to the opposite side of the airport and
requiring aircraft to be vectored over-the-top do not
significantly impact the controllers' workload. Neither
the controller who must initiate an over-the-top
instruction nor the controller who receives aircraft from
over-the-top are significantly impacted by this task.
4.4.1.2.2. Advisory Agreement. The controllers were
asked how much they agreed with the runway and sequence
advisories (fig. 8). Their reported agreement with the
runway advisories was between sometimes and often.
Their reported agreement with the sequence advisories was
just above the middle-response of _Qmctimes. It should be
made clear that agreement with the advisories was not
necessarily synonymous with adherence to the advisories,
which was determined from the engineering data and is
reported in Robinson et al. (ref. 13) and Isaacson et al.
(ref. 12). While the controllers may have performed at a
95% adherence to the pFAST advisories, they may not
have agreed with the advisories 95% of the time. In other
words, the controllers could work the traffic in accordance
with the pFAST advisories, but not agree with some
sequences or runway advisories. Unless a particular
advisory was unworkable from the controller's viewpoint,
the adherence to the pFAST advisories in general was
likely to be high.
11
Greatly 4
Somewhat 3
Minimally
f
I
2:-
Not at All 1 4
Sending Aircraft Receiving Aircraft
Figure 7. Controlling over-the-top aircraft and the contribution to overall workload.
Often
Agree
Sometimes
Agree
Rarely
Agree
7
0!
5 _-
'T
2"-
RunwayAdvisory Sequence Advisory
Figure 8. Agreement with the advisories.
4.4.1.2.3 Workload Impact of Planning and Following
Advisories. The ratings for planning and following the
runway and sequence advisories are shown in figure 9.
Controllers rated both advisories between _omewhat and
minimally contributing to their overall workload.
4.4.2 Coordination Communication
4.4.2.1 Observation Data
The transcript data were used to describe the impact of
pFAST on controller coordination and communication.
Available baseline observations were compared with field
evaluation observations. It should be noted that baseline
observations were gathered both before the operational
testing and within the overall time frame during which the
pFAST testing took place (but when the advisories were
not being presented). The data were collapsed across both
North am South flow, and the number of instances of
each cod_ was tabulated. The baseline data consist of a
larger pool of controllers; in addition to the pFAST
Assessment Team, other controllers who were not trained
on pFAST were observed.
4.4.2.2 A_ost Frequent Coordination Categories
Over boti_ baseline and test conditions, the five most
frequently discussed categories were pFAST/ARTS-related
issues, point-outs, handoff issues, runway assignments,
and aircraft altitude changes. These categories are described
in table I.
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Table I. Five most frequent coordination categories
Category Name Description
pFAST/ARTS-related Issues •
Point-outs
Handoff Issues
Runway Assignments
Aircraft Altitude Changes
Keyboard entry procedures required for pFAST-related
inputs, as well as display issues related to pFAST
pFAST being turned on or off, or problems with the
display of pFAST information (due to the ARTS
interface)
• Aircraft requiting:
* Special handling
* Crossing through airspace that was not
normally assigned to such aircraft
* APREQs (approval requests, especially from
airports internal to the TRACON)
• Utilizing another controller's airspace, but retaining
communication/control of the aircraft
• Often nonverbal
• Asking for handoffs
• Frequency changes
• Ownership
• What the runway assignments were
• Changes to runway assignments
• Expedited descents
• Coordination based on altitude
• Inquiring about aircraft altitudes
13
4.4.2.3 Baseline versus Test Coordination Comparison
The baseline and test conditions were compared and
statistically significant differences in coordination were
found in the categories of Runway Assignment, Sequence,
Spacing, Point-outs, and Status Check. Figure 10 depicts
the means and standard deviations of the baseline data
compared to the pFAST test data. Table 2 lists the results
of the statistical tests.
In four of these categories--Runway Assignment,
Sequence, Spacing, and Status Check--the pFAST test
conditions demonstrated more coordination per rush
regarding these topics than the baseline conditions. The
Runway Assignment category, as described in table 1,
related to runway assignments or changes to the runway
assignments. The Sequence and Spacing categories both
concern the sequence advisories. The sequence category
specifically refers to which aircraft are to follow which
other aircraft and the sequence advisory itself. The spacing
category refers to accommodating the sequence through
changes to the existing spacing. The Status Check
category was assigned to discussions referring to the
current state of the traffic situation in qualitative terms,
such as "Is everything going all right?" and comments
from area supervisors checking on the workload of the
controllers.
The point-outs category was the only coordination
category which demonstrated a significant trend in the
opposite direction. Point-outs are defined as coordination
with another position so as to utilize another controller's
airspace, but retaining communication and control
(M. Prichard, personal communication, 1997). There was
significantly more point-out coordination observed in the
baseline than in the test condition. However, the con-
trollers' mean ratings of point-outs contributing to work-
load fell in the range of minimally to not at all under the
test conditions.
Tables 3 and 4 list the five most frequent categories of
discussion in the baseline versus test conditions. The
mean frequency (and standard deviation) of instances of
coordination per rush is presented.
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Figure 10. Baseline versus pFAST coordination comparison.
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Table 2. Baseline versus pFAST coordination
comparison
Category Statistical Results
Runway Assignment F[1,32] = 14.97, p < 0.001
Sequence F[1,32] = 16.72, p < 0.001
Spacing F[1,32] = 7.43, p < 0.05
Point-outs F[1,32] = 5.62, p < 0.05
Status Check F[1,32] = 9.87, p < 0.05
Table 3. Most common categories of coordination
under baseline conditions
Category Mean (SD)
Point-outs 10.90 (10.52)
Altitude Changes t 4.90 (3.45)
I-Iandoffs t 4.20 (3.52)
Heading Changes 4.10 (2.85)
Runway__Assignment* 2.50 (2.59)
Weather* 2.50 (4.12)
tCategories common to both baseline and test
conditions.
*The weather category result may be misleading, as
weather conditions were more uniform during the
pFAST test than during baseline observations.
Table 4. Most common categories of coordination
under pFAST test conditions.
Category Mean (SD)
Runway Assignment: 8.58 (4.65)
ARTS Problems 7.50 (5.41)
Handoffs* 7.21 (4.19)
Sequence 6.75 (4.09)
Altitude Changes* 5.74 (4.45)
tCategories common to both ,aseline and test
conditions.
As shown in tables 3 and 4, there were three categories
whose coordination frequency was common to both
baseline and test conditions: altitude changes, runway
assignments, and handoffs. There were more frequent
altitude change discussions in the test condition than in
the baseline condition. In addition, there was more
frequent coordination regarding handoffs in the test
condition than in the baseline condition. Runway
assignments were discussed in both conditions, but as
described above, were discussed significantly more in the
test condition.
If the top five categories are an indication of discussion
per rush, it appears that the frequency of discussion under
pFAST conditions is higher and more evenly distributed
for the top five categories. In baseline conditions, with the
exception of point-outs, there is relatively infrequent
discussion about the other four categories.
4.4.2.4 Center Comments
Some positive comments were collected from Ft. Worth
Center, after the operational testing was completed (due to
constraints on researcher staffing, no formal assessment
was made at the Center during the pFAST test). One
Center controller who was interviewed reported noticing
turbo props being assigned to runway 18R, which he
found unusual. This controller also reported that he
noticed his holding was reduced by about 20% during the
pFAST test. It should be pointed out that this is just one
controller's observation and reflects just one aspect of
delay reduction.
4.5 Acceptance
Usability and suitability results ultimately help to
determine the overall acceptance of the system. In addition
to providing usability and suitability measures, the
controllers provided a direct rating of acceptance using the
CARS. Prior to the beginning of the pFAST field
evaluation, the CARS was used in simulation testing
(ref. 10). Further, the pFAST Assessment Team helped
provide the specific definitions of the CARS anchors,
including defining adequate versus desired performance.
4.5.1 Numerical Ratings
The controllers' overall CARS rating across all the test
rushes was 7.82 (SD = 1.10). This rating, rounded to 8, is
associated with the following description of the system:
"Mildly unpleasant deficiencies. System is acceptable and
minimal compensation is needed to meet desired
performance."
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Asdiscussed above, a portion of the test rushes occurred
under free-flow acceptance rate conditions. The increased
airport acceptance rate could have affected controller
acceptance of pFAST, as a higher traffic level would
presumably create more workload. Figure 11 shows the
CARS ratings under free-flow and under more restrictive
airport acceptance rates. There was no statistically
significant difference between the two sets of CARS
ratings.
The CARS ratings were significantly correlated with
agreement with the runway advisories and how often the
sequence numbers were considered to be in error. The
higher the agreement with the runway advisories, the
higher the CARS rating (r = 0.502, p < 0.01). The more
often a sequence number err_ was noted, the lower the
CARS rating (r = --0.424, p < 0.02).
The CARS ratings were also significantly correlated with
the amount of effort required to accomplish the controlling
tasks, using the advisories. The more the advisories were
rated as making the work easier, the higher the CARS
rating (r = 0.55, p < 0.001).
Finally, the CARS ratings were also significantly
correlated with final controller ratings of their traffic feed.
The more the final controllers felt that pFAST made their
traffic much easier to manage and control, the higher the
CARS rating (r = 0.702, p < 0.002).
4.5.2 Comments
In addition to the numerical and confidence ratings, the
controllers were asked to provide comments on their
CARS rating forms that would help clarify their ratings.
Forty-five :_ercent of the CARS data collected did not
include coxuments. The lack of formally reported
comments is due to two major factors. First, there were
extensive debriefing sessions following the test rushes,
often providing an opportunity for the controllers to report
their opinions. Second, testing periods sometimes
occurred with limited downtime in between the rushes. As
the controllers were required to fill out, at minimum, three
different surveys following each rush period, they were
likely to only provide comments on the CARS form
when they experienced problems that they wanted to
highlight. As a result, it should be noted that positive
comments were provided during debriefings, but were not
always wvtten down on the CARS form.
The comments that were reported on the CARS forms
were summarized into six major categories, as shown in
figure 12. The six categories were Sequence advisories,
Runway advisories, ARTS problems, Traffic Load,
Positive Comments, and Other. The Other category
included comments regarding general questions about
pFAST, the update rate of the advisories, external forces
on the performance of pFAST (such as the Center feed or
weather problems), and the effects of a lack of familiarity
with pFAST. The controller comments were not cate-
gorized according to the severity with which a controller
assigned a particular topic, so the tabulation of these
comments reflected a continuum of minor disagreements
with advisories to major philosophical differences with
how the traffic should be controlled.
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As shown in figure 12, the majority of the comments
(over 40%) were concerned with the sequence advisories.
These comments related to overtakes and general disagree-
ment with some sequences. The next-most-common
comments related to the runway advisories where the
controllers identified such issues as runway balancing
and difficulty in achieving the over-the-top runway
assignment.
Seven percent of the comments were purely positive
in nature; for example, a controller expressing the
opinion that the system ran very well with pFAST
advisories.
The remaining two major categories reflect the difficulty
in evaluating the system, or conditions affecting the
acceptance rating: ARTS problems (11% of the
comments) and Traffic Load (7% of the comments).
The ARTS problems reflected issues unrelated to CTAS
operations, such as the lack of advisory information at a
position (due to equipment problems), the improper
display of advisories, the "slinky effect" (which denoted a
noticeable display lag between the FDB movement and
advisory movement on the FDAD), and situations in
which it was not possible to "quick-look" a controller's
advisories from another controller position. The traffic
load comments related to the traffic load being either too
high or too low at that particular controller position for
the controller to feel that s/he could make a sound
evaluation.
5.0 Discussion
The pFAST operational test was conducted during a
variety of rush periods over several airport configurations.
The human factors data that were gathered contribute to
the understanding of the impact of pFAST on the air
traffic controller and the tasks for which the controller is
responsible.
The pFAST operational evaluation results can be
compared and contrasted with results obtained in the
operational evaluation of COMPAS by DLR researchers.
Although the COMPAS tool differs significantly from
pFAST, and there are inherent differences in the operating
procedures and facilities into which COMPAS was
deployed versus pFAST, it is useful to examine what
factors contributed to the success of COMPAS. The
DLR researchers found general controller acceptance of
COMPAS which they attributed to less required vectoring
(more direct clearances), better coordination between
en route and terminal environments, and a decrease in the
minimum separation distance over time.
Similar engineering results to the COMPAS results were
achieved in the pFAST operational evaluation (ref. 11).
An analysis conducted prior to the pFAST field evalua-
tions suggested that reduced spacing between arrivals on
final approach could also be anticipated in pFAST that
would contribute to an overall increase in efficiency of
operations (ref. 26). The controller-rated acceptance of
pFAST can be attributed to both the functional engineer-
ing benefits that were achieved and the positive human
factors results discussed below.
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5.1 Usability
From the usability perspective, controller ratings indicated
that the additional inputs required to manipulate some of
the pFAST advisories did not significantly increase work-
load. At best, the runway advisories were acceptable
enough to require few corrections, or at worst, did not
impact controller workload significantly when changes
were indeed required.
When changes to the runway advisories were required, the
greatest concern that the controllers voiced had to do with
the delay from waiting for changes to update. While the
delay was not rated as excessive, it is a potential area of
concern which relates to the interface between CTAS and
existing FAA hardware systems. Some observable lag
between inputs and feedback may be unavoidable, but may
also be reduced or alleviated with future equipment
upgrades. It will be critical for the operational system to
provide adequate training to the controllers so that they
expect a lag time, and are able to work with it and
distinguish genuine update time from a delay that might
signify other problems with the system.
From a communication_and coordination standpoint, the
usability results showed that the amount of communi-
cation required due to the use of the pFAST advisories was
not more than normal. This shows that pFAST is not
creating additional interactions with other controllers or
with the aircraft. Further examination of the
communication data, such as determining the types of
commands that controllers issued and contrasting such data
under baseline with pFAST operations, would be useful in
describing the impact of pFAST on controller
communications. Such data analysis is forthcoming. The
COMPAS testing determined that fewer heading changes
were issued in the terminal area, and more direct vectoring
was observed when COMPAS was in use (ref. 27). The
controllers did not comment about this under the pFAST
conditions, but this may be an area worth investigating as
the communications data are analyzed. Again, the very
different control environments would likely contribute to
differences in results, but the COMPAS results are
instructive in suggesting likely effects of ATC
automation tools.
Unexpectedly, the controllers reported that the sequence
advisories were not that useful when coordinating with
other controllers. This result is somewhat contradicted by
two other findings: first, observations determined that
there was significantly increased discussion about the
sequence advisories under test conditions, compared to
available baseline data; second, controllers seemed very
concerned about the sequences when they were asked to
rate system acceptance. Robinson et al. (ref. 13) have
suggested that the sequence advisories provide an addi-
tional benefit to controllers by indicating a gap in the
sequence and show where a hole in the traffic stream
should be maintained. The human factors data show that
the controllers clearly were paying attention to the
sequence advisories, but perhaps they did not consider their
discussion about maintaining a sequence to be pertinent to
the actual sequence advisories themselves.
5.2 Suitability
The suitability results show that pFAST is able to
provide assistance to the controller by supporting
controlling strategies and planning. Workload is a key
measure in this analysis. The workload results reflect how
usability elements contribute to the overall workload
experienced. A highly positive workload result would have
been an indication of a dramatic reduction in workload; a
highly negative workload result would have been an
indication of a dramatic increase in workload. The
workload ratings suggest that pFAST had little to no
effect on workload levels. The "non-effect" can be seen as
a positive result, however, demonstrating that pFAST did
not detract from operations. Improvements in throughput
and runway spacing were achieved without adversely
impacting the controller's workload.
Additional positive results can be seen in the comparison
of free-flow and below free-flow traffic rates. No difference
in overall workload between the two traffic levels was
found, suggesting that pFAST can be helpful under highly
challenging traffic loads without increasing workload. It
should be noted, however, that in the future, free-flow
operations may require some modifications to
Center/TRACON traffic management coordination and
procedures.
Controlling strategies were for the most part unaffected,
though there was some discrepancy over whether the
advisories were followed more closely at selective times.
Following the advisories more when there was low traffic
suggests that the controllers were paying attention and
evaluatiltg the advisories, and that they did so when they
had time. Following the advisories more when there was
high tralfic suggests that the controllers had enough trust
in the s)stem to use the advisories even when they did not
have adequate time to fully consider each advisory. While
these responses seem to conflict, it should not be ruled
out that different controllers will rely upon pFAST
differently. Since both responses were obtained, it is
reasona _le to assume that pFAST will be used in both
ways.
Another controlling strategy, sending and receiving aircraft
over-the-top, was a likely source of increased effort, but
was not rated as a significant contributor to workload.
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Thisstrategycouldbeanissuethatisresolvablewith
experience;in initial(simulation)testingofpFAST,it
appearedtobeamoresignificantissuethanit actually
becameduringtheoperationaltest.
Overall,thecontrollersdidnotreportthatpFASTaffected
theirabilitytocontroltrafficintheirsectors;thisresult
suggeststhatpFASTdidnotinterferewithcontrollers'
day-to-dayresponsibilities,andallowedthemtocontinue
toachievesafeandexpedienttrafficflows.
Thecontrollersdidnotreporttremendousagreementwith
theadvisoriesthemselves;theirmeanresponsesf ll
between"sometimesagree"and"oftenagree."However,
theengineeringdatashowverypositiveresultsfor
adherence to both runway and sequence advisories during
the operational test (ref. 12). It is possible that the
controllers felt that the advisories needed to be "perfect,"
thus their ratings may reflect their tendency to characterize
a less-than-perfect test rush as problematic. This would
contribute to their agreement ratings being less positive
than the adherence results.
The controllers and the engineering team differed in their
definition of perfect advisories. From the controller's
perspective, a perfect rush likely reflected a condition in
which the advisories matched her/his view of the traffic
situation; this does not account for pFAST's knowledge
of traffic outside of the controller's perception. Further-
more, it is unrealistic to expect that pFAST advisories
would always perfectly match each controller's prefer-
ences. In contrast, a perfect rush in terms of the flow
efficiency measured by the engineers was one in which
delay was minimized. To attempt to issue advisories that
always minimized delay could have produced a traffic
scenario that might have been more difficult (or
impossible) for the controller to accomplish (whether in
terms of ability or comfort level). Thus, Robinson et al.
(ref. 13) noted that it was more important to prevent the
occurrence of poor advisories rather than to strive for
issuing a series of perfect advisories. By occasionally
presenting advisories that were less than optimal
(engineering-wise), it was possible to achieve greater
controller agreement and allow the controllers to work
with the advisories. The balance between the optimization
of the advisories and the workability of the advisories will
always be an issue in the development of automation aids.
The sequence and runway advisories have been treated
together in the human factors data analysis. It should not
be assumed that their impact is necessarily equivalent,
however. Disagreements with the sequence advisories did
appear to be more noticeable, and created more concern
than runway advisory disagreements. It is possible that an
incorrect sequence is more obvious than an incorrect
runway assignment. In addition, an incorrect sequence is
something that must be corrected. A runway assignment
can be a source of disagreement, but may still be correct
and must be assigned because there is no other choice.
The coordination data provided some of the most
interesting results. As Hopkin (ref. 14) has stated,
coordination (between controllers) helps ensure safe
aircraft handling. While the controllers did not report any
significant increase in controller-to-aircraft or controller-
to-controller coordination, some changes in coordination
were observed between baseline and pFAST conditions.
Runway assignments, sequences, and spacing were
discussed with significantly greater frequency under the
pFAST conditions. This result is somewhat expected, as
the new information provided to the controller, as well as
the testing environment itself, would likely promote
discussion about the advisories. Increased discussion
regarding status checking was also found under pFAST
conditions relative to baseline, but could be an artifact of
the operational evaluation itself. It is likely that the
testing environment prompted the controllers and super-
visors to increase their monitoring and awareness of
operations in order to identify problems.
The most interesting coordination finding was the
significant decrease in point-out activity under operational
test conditions relative to baseline. Twice as many point-
outs occurred under baseline conditions as occurred under
pFAST conditions. Point-outs are common coordination
activities between controllers and, as described above, are
used to retain control over an aircraft, but to utilize the
airspace of another controller. Reducing the number of
point-outs could allow controllers to spend more time
separating aircraft and monitoring the aircraft, rather than
being concerned with coordination (M. Prichard, personal
communication, 1997). It could also allow controllers to
coordinate regarding other aspects of the traffic control
process; perhaps more advance planning could be
accomplished given more time to evaluate the traffic
situation, therefore resulting in controllers using each
other's airspace less than they would have to otherwise.
Alternatively, point-outs could be reduced out of necessity
as there was increased discussion regarding the advisories.
However, if this were the case, the controllers should have
indicated concerns over coordination. In contrast, the
controllers did not report any difficulties with the amount
of coordination that they experienced, and did not feel the
amount of coordination required was increased by the use
of the pFAST advisories. The point-outs themselves were
not reported to contribute, on average, more than
minimally to the overall workload.
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It is important to note that the coordination discussed here
does not just refer to that which involves the arrival
controllers, but could reflect coordination between the
arrival controllers and the Center or elsewhere in the
TRACON. This is a positive finding that should be
verified through further study during actual implementa-
tion of pFAST. When such an assessment is attempted,
there should be discussion with the Center controllers to
see if they also notice changes in the frequency of
coordination with the TRACON. While information about
Center operations was obtained from one Center
controller, indicating a reduction in holding, it should be
noted that this was one controller's assessment, and that
holding at other sectors might not have been as great, if
holding would have happened at all (holding rarely occurs
simultaneously at all sectors). It is worth pointing out,
however, that reduced delay at one sector translates into
benefits for all sectors and the overall traffic flow, though
these benefits may be manifested in different ways.
TMA was used for Center metering on two days at the end
of the pFAST field evaluation, This TMA-influenced
traffic feed has not been analyzed to see if there were any
detectable differences in the human factors data. Such an
analysis would be very useful in helping to determine how
two of the CTAS tools work together. However, the data
could also be confounded with the fact that TMA was used
to meter at the end of the pFAST assessment, when issues
such as training and system familiarity might also
contribute to any significant differences that would be
detecte_
There was no attempt to analyze the impact of workload
upon the controller in terms of the traffic complexity.
Indeed, the time of day and rush periods define the traffic
complexity that is experienced per rush. Bruce et al.
(ref. 28) found that traffic complexity in an en route
environment was _ significant predictor of performance
pressure, and it is likely that the same would be true in
the terminal environment. Because of the small sample
sizes in the different rush periods, we are not confident of
drawing conclusions about the impact of traffic complex-
ity upon controller time pressure or other aspects of
workload. This would be an area for further investigation
in the future, however.
5.3 Acceptance
The acceptability of the overall pFAST system was
measured through the CARS and controller comments.
The CARS was an easy-to-use, simple system for
gathering acceptance ratings, and the ratings did not
significantly differ between free-flow and below free-flow
traffic rates. Further, the CARS ratings were correlated
with advisory agreement, amount of effort used to
accomplish controlling tasks, and how well pFAST made
the traffic easy to manage and control. Comments
provided trom the CARS forms again reflect the predomi-
nant concern about the sequence advisories over all other
topic areas.
In CTAS development, the CARS has only been used in
the assessment of the pFAST automation; consequently,
there are concerns about the interpretation of the CARS
results and the scale needs to be further validated. Some
validation issues include verifying that providing means
and standard deviations in describing the ratings is
appropriate; incorporating the confidence ratings in the
interpretation of the results; and interpreting groups of
controller results, where the actions of one controller
directly impact the actions of another. Because Mitchell
and Aponso (ref. 24) have determined that reporting means
and standard deviations in using the Cooper-Harper scale is
appropriate, the CARS data are also reported here using
means and standard deviations; it is recognized, however,
that further analysis is still necessary to explore this
issue.
It should be acknowledged that even positive acceptance
ratings themselves do not provide a full indication of how
the entire facility is likely to react towards the eventual
deployment of pFAST. There are still issues regarding job
satisfaction and other elements of acceptance that are not
easily quantified. It was clearly demonstrated in the
operational evaluation that the performance of pFAST
was acceptable within the boundaries of the testing
environment. How the tool itself will be accepted by the
controllers at DFW, as well as in a national deployment,
can be influenced by many other factors.
Controllers who have not been so deeply involved in the
development of pFAST are likely to be concerned that this
new automation will change the nature of the controller's
job quit_ substantially. This is a typical concern with
automatton that is not unique to air traffic control. Indeed,
this is an issue that will be faced as new automation is
developed that provides even more assistance to the
controller. Currently, pFAST only suggests runway
assignments and the landing sequence. Controller concern
may grow as Active FAST begins to suggest headings,
altitude;, or other control functions to manage the traffic.
When considering these issues and concerns, it is
important to keep in mind that the nature of the traffic
envirorment itself is evolving to a condition in which
such assistance may be essential to the controlling task.
Wickens et al. (ref. 29) have described the concept of
automation as "a device or system that accomplishes
(partially or fully) a function that was previously carried
out (partially or fully) by a human operator." Their
discussion points out that the definition of automation
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willchangeovertimewiththecontinuedadvancesin
technologyandthecontinuedinteractionfthehuman
user.Therefore,whatwasonceconsideredaprimary
controllerfunctionislikelytochange,andwhathe
currentcontrollersmightconsideraninvasionoftheirjob
responsibilitieswillchangeasmoreautomationis
integratedintotheirworkenvironment.
Theimpactonoverallacceptancecouldbethatsome
controllerswillbelessinterestedintheirjobsas
automationassistanceis increased.Someofthetypical
planningandstrategizingfunctions,whichmaybewhat
currentlymakesthejobrewarding,willcertainlydecrease
orberemoved.However,theintegrationofautomation
will likelyposenewanddifferentchallenges,creatingan
environmentthatwillstillappealtocontrollers,although
perhapsindifferentwaysthanbefore.
5.4Lessons Learned: Constraints of Field Testing
As outlined in this report, the field evaluation
environment produced challenges in the assessment of
pFAST that would probably not have been faced if such
an assessment had been conducted in a laboratory setting.
For example, there was no control over the airport
configurations and AARs, which would have simplified
the data analysis. There were also no guarantees about
the staffing of the controller positions; while the majority
of the rushes were staffed by the Assessment Team
controllers, some substitute controllers participated when
Assessment Team members were not available. Because
only a small group of the overall facility had been chiefly
involved in pFAST development, the facility at large did
not have a good understanding of pFAST. As a result,
misconceptions could occur suggesting that pFAST was
causing problems, even when pFAST was not being used.
Concerns might also be raised about the fact that pFAST
was developed and tested by the same group of controllers.
It could be argued that the Assessment Team was not able
to give the most balanced appraisal of pFAST capabili-
ties, though in actuality, the Assessment Team members
were always very frank in their evaluation of the system.
However, if time and resources on the part of the facility
had permitted, it would have been useful to train a new
group of controllers on the use of pFAST and have this
new group involved in the testing and validation process,
and help to provide a wider range of experience and skill
levels to the data collected.
The test periods themselves were limited by facility
concerns about the traffic, or conditions of severe or
unpredictable weather. The human factors team's concerns
about the negative impact of the questionnaire-gathering
process reduced the overall amount of questionnaire data
that would have ideally been collected. The human factors
team was also unable to directly observe or measure the
impact of pFAST on the Tower or the Center. Finally,
the problems that come from research in general, such as
unexpected loss of data, and the unavailability of data, also
occurred.
Some of these challenges were not anticipated in the
development process leading up to the pFAST evaluation
and led to more scrutiny and analysis of the data. The
human factors data gathered during the pFAST evaluation
are "noisy" as a consequence, and care should be exercised
in extending the interpretation of the results to other
similar tools or ATC environments.
There are several lessons learned from the pFAST field
evaluation that could be instructive in future field
evaluations and field deployment. Some of these
recommendations are as follows:
• Plan to collect data systematically at the upstream and
downstream facilities (Center and Tower, for pFAST).
• Plan alternate data collection in situations where the
automation must be shut off due to unanticipated
traffic or weather.
• Work with the facility to recognize when problems
are due to the test and not to other unrelated hardware
or software problems.
• Attempt to reduce the fatigue involved with repeatedly
asking the same questions using the same question-
naires: perhaps streamline the questionnaires
themselves mid-way through the test to eliminate
questions that have not shown meaningful results;
devise ways to achieve the same objectives as those
intended by questionnaires to create more variety;
focus questionnaires more narrowly to target fewer
areas of interest.
6.0 Conclusion
The development of new ATC automation tools must
provide demonstrable benefits for controllers. Such
benefits should, at least, be in the form of accurate and
useful information. From an overall system perspective,
operations should demonstrate improvement, such as
increased throughput and enhanced efficiency. Addition-
ally, a benefits assessment must examine the system's
impact on the controller and the controller's job. Positive
benefits to the controller would be in the form of reduced
or maintained controller workload, no unanticipated or
unreasonable increase in controller responsibilities (such
as increased frequency of inter-facility coordination or
communication with aircraft), and continued job satis-
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faction (where the challenge of the daily tasks is at least
maintained). Overall acceptance, which will determine
how much a new system is utilized, will depend directly
on these elements.
The human factors data from the pFAST field evaluation
provide a complement to the overall engineering data that
were collected. The engineering data show benefits of
runway balancing and throughput. The human factors data
describe the outcome of these benefits on the controllers
themselves. Because of the heightened throughput and
more efficient runway balancing during the pFAST field
evaluation, it would not have been surprising if con-
trollers reported increased workload. The human factors
data instead bear out a different conclusion: despite the
increased number of aircraft controlled during the field
evaluation, the controllers did not report any significant
increase in mental demand, time pressure, or overall effort.
While controllers did not rate pFAST as improving their
performance, they reported no detriment to their job
satisfaction. The perceived workload remained at about the
level to which the controllers say they are accustomed.
These findings can be viewed as very positive.
Further, the additional information provided by the
pFAST advisories and the increased discussion regarding
the advisories were not found to significantly impact
controller workload. Point-outs were reduced during
pFAST test rushes compared to baseline data. Reduced
point-outs suggest that the controller is able to concen-
trate on the key tasks of monitoring and controlling
aircraft, and possibly coordinate regarding other aspects of
traffic control. It is also possible that the pFAST opera-
tions lead to less frequent use of another controllers'
airspace. This could provide benefits for not only the
arrivals to the major airport within the TRACON, but for
other airports within the TRACON, departures, and Center
operations. Further studies should investigate the impact
of pFAST upon other sectors, and try to determine if the
reduced point-outs can translate into more time for the
controllers to engage in planning activities, or other traffic
control-related tasks.
The human factors data also show that the controllers were
primarily concerned with the accuracy of the sequence
advisories. They appeared to comment most frequently on
sequence advisory problems, but their adherence to the
advisories themselves was very high. The expectation that
the advisories should be perfect is unrealistic, and may be
something that will change with continued use of the
system. Aiso, as CTAS is able to be implemented on
faster hardware and the interface between CTAS and
existing AI'C hardware is improved, the update lags that
were observed may be significantly reduced.
The ultimate success of pFAST as demonstrated by the
operational evaluation is due to the successful incorpo-
ration of pFAST into ATC operations; this was partially
aided by the long history of controller involvement in the
design and testing of pFAST. As Hopkin (ref. 14) has
suggested, controllers need to understand new systems in
order to effectively utilize and integrate them into their
existing knowledge and experience. The development of
pFAST employed a strategy of closely coupling the
human factors engineers, developers, and controllers. The
human factors involvement in the development process
contributed to identifying controller needs and determining
if those needs were met. The trust of the air traffic
controlle_ and their willingness to test pFAST opera-
tionally were results of this design approach. Without
controlle_ understanding and support of the system,
benefits might never have been identified.
The attention that has been paid to the human factors
issues has helped to define CTAS and ensure that it will
meet controller needs. The human factors findings from
the pFAST operational evaluation help to validate the
processe_; which guided pFAST (and CTAS) software
developr lent and demonstrate how benefits are achieved
not only in terms of overall airport throughput and
efficient y, but in terms of the impact upon the controller.
The positive human factors findings increase the
confidence in the operational deployment of pFAST by
making sure that key issues from the controllers'
perspect ve have been examined.
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Appendix A. Questionnaires and Rating Scales Used in the Operational
Field Evaluation
Controller Workload Assessment (Modified NASA-TLX)
Controller Workload Assessment
Please rate along the scales below be following attTibutesof the last trafficperiod you justexperienced:
MENTAL DEMAND Please rate the amount of mental and perceptual activity required (e.g., thinking, deciding,
calculating, remembering, looking, searching, etc.):
I I I I I I I I I I I
Very Much Neither Very Much Very Little
nor Very Little
TIME PRESSURE Please rate the amount of _ pressure you felt due to the rate or pace atwhich events occurred,
while using the Passive FAST advisones:
I I I I I I I I I I I
Very Much Neither Very Much Very Uttle
norVery Little
PERFORMANCE SUPPORT Please rate how much the Passive FAST advisories, as well as the displays, slewball, ARTS
keyboard, and the radar information assisted you in accomplishing your tasks:
I I I I I I I I I I I
Provided Very Neither Very Much Provided Very Little
Much Support nor Very Little Support
OVERALL EFFORT Please rate the overall amount of mental andphysical effort required to accomplish your level of
performance using the PassiveFAST advisories:
I I I I I I I I I I I
Very Neither Very Much Very Uttle
Much Effort nor Very Little Effort
Required Required
|
SATISFACTION Please rate the overall degree to which you felt secure,
vs. FRUSTRATION gratified, content, and relaxed versus the degree to which you felt discouraged, irritated,
stressed or annoyed duringthe rush,using the Passive FAST advisories:
I
Very Satisfied
and Not
Frustrated
I I I I I I I I I I
Neither Very Unsatisfied
Satisfied nor and Frustrated
Unsatisfied,
nor Frustrated
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Contributors to Workload
Workload Topics
Please indicate how each of the following tasks contributed to yeur workload during the past rush,
according to the following scale:
The task contributed ...
I I I I I
1 2 3 4 X
Greatly Somewhat Minimally Not at All* Did Not
Experience**
...to my overall workload during this past rush.
* Please rate a 4 if you experienced a particular item, but it did not impact your overall workload.
** Please rate an "X or leave the space blank if you did not experience a particular item listed below.
°
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
Description Rating Description
TrafficLoad
Pilot responses---errors and dela},s
Aircraft/pilot procedural violations
Giving handoffs
Plannin s or following the sequence
Overshoots
Number of altitude changes issued
Pilot routing/altitude errors
Number of vectors/routing changes
issued
Using the slewball
Planning or following the runway
assignment
Coordinating a staggered approach
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
Aircraft fli£ht characteristics
Lack of a handoff controller
Making runwa 7 assignment chanl_es
Using the ARTS keyboard
Equipment problems
Accepting handoffs
Pointing out aircraft
Dealing with go-arounds or missed
approaches (if any)
Sending aircraft over the top
Receiving aircraft over the top
iWaitin_ for the sequence to update
IThe t,/pe of feed from the Center
Rating
25. How would you describe the overall amount of traffic (the traffic _oad) that you experienced in this rush?
I [ ! I I ] I
Low Moderate High
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Post-Rush Questionnaire
Post Rush Questionnaire OP-RMT
Overall Impressions
1. How typical was the amount of traffic you experienced for this rush, compared to similar rushes at the same time
and under the same configuration conditions?
I I I I
Much Lower About
than Usual the Same
I I
Much Higher
than Usual
2. Approximately how often did you feel there should have been a runway assignment change from the one that
Passive pFAST assigned?
I I I I I I I
Rarely Sometimes Often
3. Apprgximately how often did you feel there should have been a sequence number change?
I I I I I I I
Rarely Sometimes Often
4a. Were the sequence numbers ever clearly in error (e.g., reversed sequences for aircraft established on final,
duplicate sequence numbers)?
yes no
4b. If yes, approximately how often did this occur?
I I I I I I I
Rarely Sometimes Often
5a. Did you make any changes to the runway assignments?
yes no
5b. If yes, how well did Passive pFAST update to meet your runway assignment change(s)?
I I I I I I I
Very Poorly Neither Very Well Very Well
nor Very Poorly
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6a.Did you make any changes to the sequence? yes no
6b. If yes, how well did Passive pFAST update to meet your sequence change(s)?
I I I I I I I
Very Poorly Neither Very Well Very Well
nor Very Poorly
7. How stable were the runway advisories in your position?
I I I I I
Very Unstable
I I
Very Stable
8. How stable were the sequence numbers in your position?
I I I I I
Very Unstable
I I
Very Stable
9. Overall, how did you feel that the use of the Passive pFAST advisories affected the amount of effort you needed to
accomplish your task?
I I I I I I I
Made it About Made it
Much Harder the Same Much Easier
10. How demanding were the keyboard entry requirements?
I I I I I
Very About
Demanding the Same
Not Very
Demanding
11. How did you think that Passive pFAST affected your ability to control the traffic in your sector?
I I I I I _ I
Made it Much Had no Made it Much
More Difficult Effect Easier to Control
to Control
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12.Didyouhavetocompensate for the Passive pFAST advisories by changing what you would normally do?
yes no
13a. Do you think that you followed the Passive pFAST advisories more closely at certain times of the rush than
others?
yes no
13b. If yes, when did you follow the advisories the most?
13c. If yes, when did you follow the advisories the least?
I
Controlling Strategies
la. Did you use double basing in this rush7
yes
lb. If yes, how well did the Passive pFAST advisories support you in doing this?
I I I I I I I
Made it Had No Made it
Much Harder Effect Much Easier
no
2a. Did you send aircraft over the top of the airport in this rush?
yes
2b. If yes, how well did the Passive pFAST advisories support you in doing this?
I I I I I I I
Made it Had No Made it
Much Harder Effect Much Easier
no
3. Did you have to control any go-arounds or missed approaches?
yes no
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I _'11 I " I III I II I I I I I IIIII I - I II'" _ [ I I
Communication and Coordination
For the following questions, please do not include communication or coordination that was due to go-arounds or
missed approaches.
1. Approximately how many times did you talk to each aircraft? times
2a. Did you have to communicate with the aircraft more frequently because of the Passive pFAST advisories?
yes no
2b. If yes, what did you have to communicate with the aircraft about?
3. How many times did you coordinate with the following positions?
a. Other ARs or Feeders times d. Departures
b. Area Supervisor/TMC times e. Satellites
c. Center times f. Other:
times
times
times
4. Aside from go-arounds/missed approaches, did you notice greater coordination than normal between yourself and
(please circle):
a. Other ARs or Feeders
b. Area Supervisor/TMC
c. Center
yes no d. Departures yes no
yes no e. Sate llites yes no
yes no f. Oth,;r: yes no
5. When you coordinated with other arrival controllers, or with other personnel, how often did you refer to the sequence
numbers?
I I I I I ! I
Rarely Sometimes Often
6. How useful were the sequence numbers in helping you to coordinate with other personnel by providing a common
reference?
I I I I I I I
Not at all Somewhat Very useful
Useful Useful
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I I I II
Feeder and Handoff-Feeder Controllers only
1. How satisfied were you with the feed that you got from the Center?
I
Not Very
Satisfied
I I I I
Neither
Satisfied nor
Unsatisfied
I I
Very
Satisfied
I I I I
2a. Were there any problems with the feed that you got from the Center?
2b. If yes, what problems did you have?
yes no
3. How satisfied were you with the traffic that you fed to the finals?
I I
Not Very
Satisfied
I I
Neither
Satisfied nor
Unsatisfied
I I I
Very
Satisfied
Final Controllers only
1. How did you think that Passive pFAST affected the traffic you were fed?
i I I i i I
Made it Had no
Much More Effect
Difficult
to Manage/Control
Made it
Much Easier
to Manage/Control
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Controller Acceptance Rating Scale
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Appendix B. Controller Acceptance Rating Scale (CARS) Use Guidelines
Controller Acceptance Rating Scale (CARS) Guidelines
CARS will be used by the controllers to rate the acceptability of Passive pFAST during the Operational Assessment at
DFW. To use this scale consistently, some basic definitions are defined below.
_,ystem
The system is taken to mean everything being rated: the controller's performance, the performance of Passive pFAST
(runway advisories and sequence number advisories), and the performance of the ARTS.
Pilot performance should also be considered in the system rating. A couple of conditions to keep in mind when
evaluating the overall system, and considering pilot performance:
1. If pilot response is exceptionally bad (for example, not very responsive) over several aircraft, then this could
lead to a poorer picture of how well the overall system could perform. This should be reflected in the confidence
ra_..a.0_.But to the extent that Passive pFAST was affected by bad pilot response, that should be considered in
the numerical rating.
2. If pilot response is bad, but Passive pFAST seems to react especially poorly or especially well in
incorporating the pilot situation, then this should be considered in the numerical rating.
Performance
The following are characteristics of adequate and desired performance.
ADEQUATE PERFORMANCE
The system performs at least as well as the
current system performs.
* System performs much as it does currently.
• Runways balanced as well as they are currently.
• Coordination between controllers is similar to what
currently is required.
• Reduced "guesswork" about where aircraft could be
going.
• Advisories can be reasonably followed.
• Runway assignments are good, sequence numbers
are OK (not "great").
• Runway assignments 90% accurate.
• Sequence numbers 50% accurate.
• Meeting the advisories doesn't result in excessive
pressure.
DESIRED PERFORMANCE
The system performs above and beyond the
current system performance levels.
• System performs better than it does currently.
• Runways well-balanced, ahead of when it is
normally expected.
• Coordination between controllers is reduced.
• Does away with guesswork about where aircraft
could be going.
• Less sequence swapping close in.
• Advisories are realistic in taking into account
aircraft performance.
• The system behaves predictably; it reacts
approximately the same way under the same
conditions.
• Runway assignments 90-100% accurate.
• Sequence numbers 75-80% accurate.
• Workload is well-balanced.
• Meeting the advisories doesn't increase pressure.
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Confidence
The Confidence Rating should describe confidence in the rating itself. It is not a rating of how confident one is about
CTAS or Passive pFAST. For example, the confidence rating does not answer the question, "How confident am I that
CTAS is good ATC software?"
Instead, it answers the question, "How confident am I that the rating I just made is an accurate one, reflecting the overall
system performance, based on the amount of information I had available to me?"
The confidence rating should reflect the amount of information you think you had available to you in making your
overall rating. It should also reflect problems that you encountered that are not necessarily an indication of how the
software performed. As in the example above, a pilot that is especially unresponsive and uncooperative which results in
a difficult traffic situation could mean that any problems encountered in the traffic situation could be due to more than
just Passive pFAST; the pilot response is also a factor. How much a factor is reflected in the confidence rating.
There are 3 levels of Confidence rating:
A. High Confidence
You were able to account for the traffic events that occurred. You are very certain what problems or
benefits could be due to Passive pFAST, the traffic situation, etc., and can therefore provide a rating that
really reflects how well Passive pFAST performed.
B. Moderate Confidence
You were able to account for some of the traffic outcome. You are somewhat certain what problems or
benefits could be due to Passive pFAST, the traffic situation, etc. There is some uncertainty about how
well Passive pFAST performed, given the overall situation. You have some reservations about the
accuracyofyournumerical(CARS) rating.
C. Low Confidence
It was difficult to account for the traffic outcome. There is a great deal of uncertainty about the
performance of Passive pFAST, and how you were able :o work within the whole system. You have
many reservations about the accuracy of your numerical ICARS) rating because of external factors that
you can't adequately account for.
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Appendix C. Coding Categories for Arrival Position Observations
Code To zic Subto_lanation
Runwax
01 Runway
02 Over the top
03 Runway Balancing
• what is the runway assignment/change to the runway assignment
• whether an aircraft is going over the top of the airport to a runway
on the opposite side from where it originated
• discussion of how the runways are balanced
• specific discussion of the traffic load with reference to the runways
Sequence
11
12
13
Sequence
Spacing
Blow By
• who follows whom
• sequence number
filling a hole
general spacing comments, such as the spacing needed to
accommodate departures
includes overtakes
TRACON Situation
21
22
23
24
Traffic Load
Final Len[th
Center feed
Airport Configuration
Aircraft Status
• specific to the amount, distribution, and level of traffic
• the amount of traffic they are experiencing
• the amount of traffic they are expecting
• airport acceptance rate
• how the Center is feeding them
• coordinating with the Center regarding the feed
• does not include coordinating with Center about ownership
• delay discussions
• holding
• asking about the current airport configuration
• discussing a change to North flow or South flow
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33
34
35
36
37
Speed
Altitude
Heading
Priority Aircraft
TCAS
Inquiring
Missed Approach
asking another controller about an aircraft's speed
discussing what speed to take an aircraft
asking about an aircraft's altitude
coordinating based on altitude
expedite descent
specific, explicit heading discussions
asking about where an aircraft is going with reference to a heading
discussing routing of an aircraft
includes discussion of aircraft going through the final
Emergency
aircraft equipment or mechanical problems that render it difficult or
impossible to do what ATC instructs
does not include larger equipment problems related to VORs, DMEs,
etc.
• comments on an aircraft equipped with TCAS, or TCAS warning
• trying to determine the aircraft status (it is currently unknown)
• go-arounds
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Coordination
41
42
Point Out
Ownership/Handoff
43 APREQ
Weather
• warning about an aircraft going through someone else's airspace
• asking for an approval to go through someone else's airspace
• includes physically pointing to the ac on the display ....
• asking for an aircraft to be handed off
• asking if an aircraft was handed off
• indicating ownership of an aircraft
• whether or not one is talking to an aircraft
• wrong handoff
• frequency change related to ownership .......
• approval request
• departures internal to TR airports
51
52
53
Weather
Stagger/Simuls
Visual Conditions
• ATIS commenLs
• Noting changes in the weather
• altimeter setting
• winds
• coordination specifically referencing staggering or fimuls
• VFR or IFR conditions
• Discussing ILS
r t
61
62
63
AS/Controller coaching
Staffing
Status chec'k
Communication
• providing suggestions about how to run the traffic
• inquiring about staffing needs
• asking for information from the AS
• Discussing needing handoff controllers
• Need for final monitors
• Briefing the next controller
• asking how things are going (qualitative statement)
• comment on how the overall rush is going
• controller performance ....
71
72
Communication
Problem
Correction to issued
command
stuttering speech
not hearing a comment correctly or asking for clarification about what
was said (but not with regards to clearing up a clearance or command)
speech formalisms
apologies
could be prompting on the part of the handoff controller to tell the
radar controller to correct wl-at's been said
could reflect comments abou: a misheard or misreadback clearance
Hardware
81 ] Displayproblems/issues
problems related to just the display and not with pFAST
scope problems; comment on not getting advisories, if it's just this
particular scope
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Hardware, cont'd
82 pFAST/ARTS
(problem)
83 Frequency problem •
85 Equipment
Malfunction
• anything pFAST-ARTS related:
* slinky effect
• TATCA Data Unavailable
• ZZZ's
• pFAST being turned on or off, or otherwise not working
• comments about data entry (what keys are required to make a
runway assignment change)
jammed frequency
wron s frequency
larger problems with DME outage, VOR problems
[ 99 [ Not Codable [ • not understandable, based on the transcript, what exactly was the topic [
Coding Rules
What to Code:
• Code only when the arrival controllers, area supervisor, and/or TMC are involved in the communication.
• Code even when there is only one of the TRACON arrival controllers/area supervisor/TMC as a party in the
communication.
• Code even when the communication itself is incomplete, as long as the participants are valid (in such cases, a
99 code is generally assigned).
What not to Code:
• Don't code communications between the controllers/area supervisorfl'MC and the NASA test team.
• Don't code actions, such as controllers plugging in or getting up, unless some kind of communication is attached to
this action.
• Don't code communications to the aircraft.
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